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ABSTRACT  
 
It has been argued that the Human Rights Act 1998 (‗HRA‘) establishes a 
‗dialogue‘ between the courts, parliament and the executive. This ‗dialogue‘ is 
supposed to be an exchange of ideas about rights pursuant to which policy 
goals are revised, but not blocked, following judicial decisions and takes place 
predominantly when courts issue declarations of incompatibility under s 4 of 
the HRA. There have been 18 cases in which declarations have become final. 
This article considers those 18 cases and their legislative aftermaths. It 
reveals, firstly, that parliament has some capability of dealing with rights 
issues without the courts‘ prompting, secondly, that a declaration can certainly 
lead to constructive modification of public policy but may also lead to less 
effective policy and, thirdly, that parliament has no real freedom to disagree 
with the conclusions of the courts on questions of rights when a declaration 
has been made. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When the Human Rights Act 1998 (‗HRA‘) was enacted, many 
commentators claimed that it would establish a ‗dialogue‘ between the courts, 
parliament and the executive.
1
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The concept of ‗dialogue‘ under the HRA has been explained by Alison 
Young in her book, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act.
2
 
In her book, Young defined ‗democratic dialogue models‘ as protections 
of human rights that do not grant the courts the final ability to make 
authoritatively determinative accounts as to the compatibility of legislation 
with human rights; rather, ―mechanisms are incorporated into the legal 
protection of rights that enable the legislature to respond to judicial 
determinations as to the compatibility of legislation with human rights‖.3   
Young noted that the term ‗democratic dialogue‘ derived from a well-
known journal article by Peter Hogg and Allison Thornton (nee Bushell).
4
 In 
their article, Hogg and Thornton argued that where judicial decisions were 
open to legislative reversal, modification or avoidance, it was appropriate to 
regard the relationship between the courts and the legislature as a dialogue.
5
 It 
was upon this basis that Young found it ‗easy to conclude‘6 that the HRA 
provided for a democratic dialogue model of rights protection: judicial 
decisions taken under both ss 3 and 4 of the HRA were open to reversal, 
modification or avoidance by the legislature. 
Section 3(1) of the HRA is an interpretative provision. It provides that, so 
far as it is possible to do so, primary and subordinate legislation in the United 
Kingdom must be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the 
rights set out in Schedule 1 to the HRA. The rights set out in Schedule 1 come 
from the European Convention on Human Rights (‗Convention‘).7 Section 
3(2)(b) provides that, if primary legislation is incompatible with Convention 
rights, that does not affect its validity, continuing operation or enforcement. 
Section 4(2) of the HRA provides that if a court
8
 is satisfied that primary 
legislation is incompatible with Convention rights, it may make a declaration 
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of that incompatibility. Section 4(6)(a) states that a declaration does not affect 
the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the statutory provision in 
respect of which it is given. Section 10(2) provides that, if a court makes a 
declaration then, if a Minister considers that there are compelling reasons, he 
may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he considers 
necessary to remove the incompatibility. Schedule 2 to the HRA sets out the 
process by which remedial orders are made. 
Young asserted that ss 3 and 4 established two different forms of 
dialogue.
9
 She contended that dialogue took place predominantly when courts 
issued s 4 declarations.
10
 It is this form of dialogue with which this journal 
article is concerned. 
Young argued that a declaration provided a signal to parliament that 
legislation contained provisions that were contrary to Convention rights. She 
asserted that a declaration could prompt the legislature to debate if and how to 
respond to the courts; it could respond either by amending legislation to 
ensure its compatibility with Convention rights, or by providing a justification 
for its maintenance on the statute books.
11
 Importantly, Young claimed that 
the legislature had the freedom to disagree with the conclusions of the courts 
as to the modifications required to ensure Convention compatibility.
12
   
The dialogue portrayed by Young is akin to the ‗institutional interaction‘ 
described by Leighton McDonald: an exchange of ideas about human rights 
between the parliament and the courts pursuant to which policy goals are 
revised, but not blocked, following judicial decisions.
13
  
The attraction of the concept of dialogue is obvious: if parliament chooses 
to amend legislation following a declaration then the amendment should be 
constructive from a rights standpoint; if it disagrees with the judicial decision 
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then it is free to do so. In other words, dialogue should lead ‗to a better 
outcome for rights as well as democracy‘.14 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, some say that dialogue under the HRA is nothing 
more than a ‗fantasy‘ that merely raises the question of who gets the last 
word.
15
 James Allan has argued that it is the judiciary that has the final say on 
rights issues.
16
 Allan contended that, in practice, is almost always impossible 
for a legislature to disagree with the conclusions of the courts,
17
 contrary to 
Young‘s claim. Allan asserted that, as the judges‘ views always prevailed 
over those of the legislature, that in no way resembled a dialogue.
18
 
Young‘s arguments are interesting in light of the fact that the government 
that introduced the HRA did not actually assert that it would precipitate 
‗democratic dialogue‘.19 They are of further interest in light of the fact that 
two senior Law Lords, Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Phillips of Worth 
Matravers, expressly denied that the HRA involved a dialogue between the 
courts, parliament and the executive.
20
 They are of still further interest when 
one considers that, despite the protestations of Lords Bingham and Phillips, 
many commentators have continued to maintain that the HRA has established 
a dialogue about rights between the three arms of government.
21
 The purpose 
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of this article is to examine the extent to which dialogue does take place when 
courts issue declarations of incompatibility under s 4 of the HRA.  
As at 1 January 2013, 27 declarations of incompatibility had been made 
by the courts since the HRA came into force on 2 October 2000. Of these, 18 
have become final (in whole or in part) and are not subject to further appeal 
whilst 9 have been overturned on appeal.
22
 The 18 cases in which declarations 
have been finalised and their legislative aftermaths will be considered below 
in chronological order from earliest to most recent.  
 
2. R (H) V LONDON NORTH AND EAST REGION MENTAL 
HEALTH REVIEW TRIBUNAL [2001] EWCA CIV 415, [2002] QB 
1 
 
This case concerned a patient who made an application to a mental health 
review tribunal to be discharged from detention in hospital, which was 
refused. The patient then sought judicial review by way of a declaration of 
incompatibility under s 4 of the HRA, which was also refused. The patient 
appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and declared that ss 72(1) 
and 73(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 were incompatible with the right to 
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 Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, Responding to human rights judgments: 
Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Government’s response to 
human rights judgments 2011-12 (Cm 8432, 2012), 40. In this report, it is recorded 
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incorrect in counting R (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 
EWCA Civ 875 as a declaration that had become final. The correct interpretation of 
Hooper is that a declaration was made at first instance in respect of repealed 
legislation: see R (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2002] EWHC 
191 (Admin). On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the declaration was discharged: see R 
(Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] EWCA Civ 875 [1]. On 
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, it was held that, as the 
relevant legislative provisions had been repealed, there was no point in their 
Lordships making a declaration: see R (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2005] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 WLR 1681, 1696-7. Accordingly, the making of 
the declaration in Hooper was, in reality, overturned on appeal. Therefore, as at 31 
July 2012, 27 declarations had been made by the UK courts, of which 18 had become 
final (in whole or in part) and were not subject to further appeal and 9 had been 
overturned on appeal. 
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liberty under article 5(1)(4) of the Convention in that, for the tribunal to be 
obliged to order a patient's discharge, the burden was placed upon the patient 
to prove that the criteria justifying his detention in hospital for treatment no 
longer existed; and that article 5(1)(4) required the tribunal to be positively 
satisfied that all the criteria justifying the patient's detention in hospital for 
treatment continued to exist before refusing a patient's discharge.   
In order to remove the incompatibility, the Mental Health Act 1983 
(Remedial) Order 2001 amended ss 72(1) and 73(1) to provide that a mental 
health review tribunal had to direct the discharge of a patient if it was not 
satisfied that the criteria justifying his/her detention in hospital for treatment 
continued to exist. 
The House of Lords considered the Mental Health Act 1983 (Remedial) 
Order 2001 on 11 April 2002. In moving the approval of the Order, the 
Labour Government Whip, Lord Filkin, made the following comments about 
H: 
 
―It was the government‘s view that there was no discernible error of 
law in the Court of Appeal‘s judgment and in addition, the judgment 
was not out of line with the thrust of government policy intentions for 
new mental health legislation as set out in the White Paper Reforming 
the Mental Health Act.‖23 
 
The Order was supported by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties (the Conservative peer, Baroness Noakes, described it as ‗clearly 
necessary‘) and was duly approved.24 
The Court of Appeal‗s decision in H was uncontroversial. All sides of 
British politics accepted that ss 72(1) and 73(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 
were incompatible with the right to liberty. The declaration may very well 
have resulted in a constructive modification to legislation. 
 
3. RE AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW BY MCR 
[2002] NIQB 58 
 
This case concerned a Northern Irishman who was charged with attempted 
buggery pursuant to s 62 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The 
Sexual Offences Act 1967 effectively decriminalised homosexual acts in 
private in England and Wales but s 62 remained in force in Northern Ireland. 
The accused applied for a declaration that s 62 was incompatible with his 
                                                     
23
 HL Deb 1 April 2002, vol 633, col 601. See also HC Deb 28 October 2002, vol 
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right to a private life under article 8 of the Convention. The application was 
not opposed by the Crown. In a short judgment, the High Court of Justice in 
Northern Ireland referred to two decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‗ECtHR‘) where it was noted that there was no pressing social need 
for the criminalisation of homosexual acts between consenting adult males 
performed in private. The Court made the declaration sought pursuant to s 4 
of the HRA. 
By the time McR was decided, the process of modernising British law on 
sexual offences had been underway for some time. A review of sex offences 
was set up by the UK government in 1999, the independent review group 
producing a consultation paper in July 2000. In addition the government 
carried out a review of Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and proposals 
were published for public consultation by Home Office in July 2001. These 
two reviews fed into a White Paper, Protecting the Public: strengthening 
protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual offences, 
published in November 2002.
25
 Relevantly, the White Paper stated as follows: 
 
―Certain existing offences criminalise consensual sexual activity in 
private between men, which would not be illegal between 
heterosexuals or between women. In order to provide common sense 
and making policing the law fair and practicable, these offences will 
be replaced with generic offences. This will ensure that the criminal 
law protects everyone equally from non-consensual sexual activity, 
but does not criminalise sexual activity that takes place between 
consenting adults in private.‖26 
 
The White Paper was followed by the enactment of the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003, which repealed s 62 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.  
By 2002, the British government accepted that it should not intervene in 
the personal, private relationships of consenting adults.
27
 This was obviously 
the reason why the Crown did not oppose the High Court in Northern Ireland 
making the declaration of incompatibility. There is no reason to suspect that 
the decision in McR was anything other than uncontentious. 
 
                                                     
25
 Arabella Thorp, ‗The Sexual Offences Bill (No 128) 2002-03 (UK)‘ (Research 
Paper 03/62 House of Commons Library, United Kingdom Parliament, 2003) 3. 
26
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Protecting the Public: Strengthening 
protect against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual offences (Cm 5668, 
2002) 10. 
27
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4. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT ROTH GMBH V SECRETARY 
OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT [2002] EWCA CIV 
158, [2003] QB 728 
 
This case concerned a penalty scheme created pursuant to s 32 of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which made carriers liable to a fixed 
penalty of £2,000 for every clandestine entrant to the United Kingdom found 
concealed in a vehicle. The owner, hirer and driver were liable unless they 
could establish that they were acting under duress or that they had no 
knowledge of the clandestine entrant and that there was an effective system 
for preventing the carriage of clandestine entrants which was operated 
properly on the occasion in question. Once the Home Secretary had issued a 
penalty notice a senior immigration officer could detain the vehicle if he 
considered there was a serious risk that the penalty would not be paid and no 
satisfactory alternative security had been given. In several joined proceedings, 
groups of claimants brought proceedings against the Home Secretary, 
challenging the lawfulness of the penalty scheme.   
The Court of Appeal held that the scale and inflexibility of the penalty 
without the possibility of mitigation or the right for the penalty to be 
determined by an independent tribunal were factors which made the scheme 
unfair and in breach of the claimants‘ right to a fair hearing under article 6 of 
the Convention. The Court of Appeal also held that the scheme imposed an 
excessive burden on the carriers which was disproportionate to the objective 
to be achieved and was a breach of the claimants‘ right to peaceful enjoyment 
of their possessions under article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that a declaration that the scheme was 
incompatible with article 6 of the Convention and article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention was appropriate. 
Just before the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Roth, the 
government released a White Paper on immigration and asylum policy.
28
 The 
majority of the White Paper proposals were incorporated into the subsequent 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
29
 The new Act also 
incorporated a response to Roth. Section 125 and Schedule 8 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 amended the penalty scheme 
under s 32 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 by introducing a new 
                                                     
28
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: 
Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (Cm 5387, 2002). The White Paper was 
published on 7 February 2012 (HC Deb 7 February 2002, vol 379, col 1027). Roth 
was handed down on 22 February 2002. 
29
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variable penalty of up to £4,000 for those carrying clandestine entrants by 
road or rail, a right of appeal to the County Court against the imposition 
and/or size of the penalty and the power for the Court to release a confiscated 
vehicle where it thought that penalty was not appropriate.
30
 
Members of the government, including the Home Secretary, expressly 
stated that they thought the new penalty scheme was ‗fair‘.31 Although 
members of a government are hardly likely to say that new legislation is 
unfair, there is no evidence that they were uncomfortable with the new 
penalty scheme or with the Roth decision. On the contrary, the Lord 
Chancellor indicated that he thought that the Roth decision was principled and 
fair.
32
 Some Conservative and Liberal Democrat Lords clearly wanted to 
lessen the severity of the penalty scheme even more.
33
 In those circumstances, 
it seems likely that a majority of parliament accepted, in a real way, the 
revised penalty regime brought about by Roth. 
 
5. R (ANDERSON) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME 
DEPARTMENT [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 AC 837 
 
The claimant had been convicted of two murders for which he received 
mandatory life sentences. By his stated practice, adopted pursuant to his 
power to control the release of such prisoners under s 29 of the Crime 
(Sentences) Act 1997, the Home Secretary received advice from the trial 
judge, the Lord Chief Justice and departmental officials prior to deciding the 
minimum period to be served by the claimant. In fixing the claimant's tariff,
34
 
the Home Secretary set a longer period than that recommended by the 
judiciary. The claimant challenged the decision by way of judicial review. On 
25 November 2002, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords declared 
that s 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was incompatible with the right 
under article 6 of the Convention to have a sentence imposed by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. 
                                                     
30
 David Blunkett, ‗UK Government: Criminal Refugees to be removed from country‘ 
M2 Presswire (online), 25 April 2002; M2 Presswire, ‗UK Government: New 
penalties for carrying illegal immigrants start tomorrow‘ M2 Presswire (online), 9 
December 2002. 
31
 Ibid. See also HC Deb 21 May 2002, vol 386, col 61WH (John Denham). 
32
 Lord Irvine ‗The Impact of the Human Rights Act: Parliament, the Courts and the 
Executive‘ [2003] PL 308, 318. 
33
 HL Deb 17 July 2002, vol 637, col 1354 – 1357. 
34
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Anderson was a case ‗waiting to happen‘35 because judicial erosion of the 
Home Secretary‘s tariff-setting power had already begun by the time it was 
decided.
36
 In May 2002, the ECtHR held in Stafford v United Kingdom
37
 that 
the Home Secretary's veto of a parole board's recommendation that a post-
tariff lifer should be released was contrary to the prisoner‘s right under article 
5 of the Convention to have the lawfulness of his detention decided speedily 
by a court. The Home Secretary, David Blunkett, said the following in 
relation to the Stafford judgment: 
 
―I am disappointed with this judgment which has the effect of 
removing the Home Secretary‘s statutory power to decide the release 
– on Parole Board recommendations – of adult murderers whose tariff 
has expired…I am concerned that this judgment may serve as 
encouragement for those who would like to remove the Home 
Secretary‘s powers to set tariffs for adult murderers. If this judgment 
were to be used to support a legal process to achieve this, I would seek 
to use domestic legislation to enshrine the power of Parliament to 
provide adequate punishment for the guilty – including life meaning 
life. Policy on the protection of the public and punishment of the 
guilty must always be the domain of the elected Parliament.‖38 
 
It was pretty obvious that the Home Secretary thought that the Stafford 
decision was wrong.
39
 It was also clear that, as a result of Stafford, Mr 
Anderson would probably win his appeal when it was heard later that year.
40
 
However, it was less obvious as to what the government intended to do if the 
result of Mr Anderson‘s appeal was as expected. In July, the government was 
maintaining that it was ―necessary for the maintenance of public confidence in 
the criminal justice system that decisions relating to the length of time a 
murderer spends in custody and release are taken by the Home Secretary‖41; 
however by October Mr Blunkett‘s aides were saying that the Home Secretary 
                                                     
35
 Christopher Gale and Annabelle James, ‗Comment: Mandatory Life Sentences and 
Executive Interference‘ (2002) 66 JCL 417, 421. 
36
 This process is described in detail in Stephen Shute ‗Punishing Murderers: Release 
Procedures and the ―Tariff‖, 1953-2004‘ [2004] Crim L Rev 873. 
37
 (2002) 35 EHRR 32. 
38
 M2 Communications Ltd, ‗UK Government: Stafford Judgement‘ M2 Presswire 
(online), 28 May 2002. 
39
 Stephen Pollard, David Blunkett (Hodder and Stoughton 2005) 4.  
40
 Clare Dyer, ‗Blunkett Loses Key Power to Keep Killers in Jail‘ The Guardian 
(London) 29 May 2002, 1.7. 
41
 David Barrett, ‗We should decide killer‘s fate, says top judge‘ Daily Post (London) 
9 July 2002, 19. 
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would simply bring in a new law to make sure ―life means life‖ if Mr 
Anderson‘s appeal was successful.42  
On 28 October 2002, the Conservative Opposition moved a resolution in 
the Commons that the House ‗notes with concern the impact of the 
Convention on the sentencing powers of the Home Secretary…and calls upon 
the Government…to construct a lasting settlement that can bring the [HRA] 
into conformity with the democratic will of the people…‘43 The resolution 
was defeated but it seems fairly clear that parliament had begun to seriously 
consider what it would do if confronted by a declaration on a topic of real 
public interest.
44
 
Anderson was then handed down. Mr Blunkett promised to introduce new 
legislation which would establish a clear set of principles within which judges 
would fix minimum tariffs for murderers in the future, thus indicating that the 
Home Secretary would no longer have that power.
45
 The government then 
introduced amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill which transferred the 
power to fix tariffs in mandatory lifer cases from the Home Secretary to the 
sentencing judge.
 
The legislation also established statutory guidelines which 
had to be taken into account by judges when they set the minimum terms that 
murderers had to serve before they became eligible for parole.
46
 
The guidelines were designed to place very substantial constraints on 
sentencing judges. That this is so can be seen from the Explanatory Notes to 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which state that while ‗there may be a few very 
exceptional cases in which starting points [for minimum terms] will be 
increased or decreased very substantially, it is expected that the vast majority 
                                                     
42
 David Leppard and Zoe Thomas, ‗Legal Ruling may Free 200 Killers Early‘ 
Sunday Times (London) 6 October 2002, 10. 
43
 HC Deb 28 October 2002, vol 391, col 605 (Dominic Grieve). 
44
 There were a couple of references to dialogue during the Commons debate on 28 
October 2002 (HC Deb 28 October 2002, vol 391, col 605-651) but no agreement as 
to its form. Vera Baird (Labour, Redcar) stated (at col 639): ‗There is no doubt that a 
healthy tripartite dialogue has been engendered between the courts, Parliament and 
the Executive by the Human Rights Act. They have all worked together‘. However, 
Dominic Grieve (Conservative, Beaconsfield) stated (at col 612-613): ‗We have had 
an extraordinary paradigm shift in the way in which we run our affairs. Some might 
argue that that is for the better. However, it involves a dialogue between the 
Executive and the judiciary, from which Parliament is effectively excluded. I have 
serious doubts about that process. As the dialogue continues, there is a danger that the 
process of justice, Parliament and the Executive will be brought into disrepute with 
the public‘. 
45
 HC Deb 25 November 2002, vol 395, col 100-101W. 
46
 Shute (n 36) 890. 
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of cases will tend to attract minimum terms that reflect [those prescribed by 
the Act]‘.47  
After noting that the Home Secretary‘s role of examining tariff cases was 
‗horrendous‘, Mr Blunkett explained the motivation behind the new 
legislation in the following terms: 
 
―We want to reassert the role of Parliament that historically existed 
when considering cases of murder, and to ensure that there is clarity 
and a response to public concern… 
 
―Today I am responding to the [Anderson] judgment. Although I 
accept that it takes the tariff out of the hands of the Home Secretary – 
as I said, no Home Secretary would be sorry to see that go – we are 
trying to achieve the same result.‖48  
 
Although it may have been traumatic to consider horrific murders, it 
seems unlikely that Mr Blunkett wanted to give up his tariff setting power. He 
knew that he could hand that power over to the judiciary but he fought Mr 
Anderson all the way to the House of Lords to try and keep it. Even after 
Anderson went against him, he introduced legislation that had, as he saw it, 
the express purpose of retaining the status quo; that is, accountability to the 
public for sentences served by murderers.  
If Mr Blunkett had tried to retain his tariff setting power after Anderson, 
he may very well have received the support of the Conservative Party
49
 and a 
large section of the general public. As noted above, he wanted to retain 
parliament‘s accountability to the public for terms of imprisonment served by 
murderers. Anderson did not, of course, change or strike down any law: the 
House of Lords merely declared s 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 to be 
incompatible with the Convention. Why then did Mr Blunkett and the 
government not simply ignore Anderson?  
There was probably a combination of reasons. Firstly, the government 
may have considered that the new legislation would be effective; that is, it 
would force the judiciary to hand down the minimum sentences that the 
government wanted. Secondly, it may not have wanted to provoke a political 
fight with those who believed that the Home Secretary had no place setting 
tariffs and/or that the judiciary should not be questioned on matters of human 
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rights.
50
 Thirdly, and most likely, the government recognised that Mr 
Anderson would simply take his case to the ECtHR where he would win. Mr 
Blunkett was advised by the Home Office that he had no chance of success in 
Strasbourg because of the ECtHR‘s decision in Stafford.51 
Sir Philip Sales and Richard Ekins disagree with Young‘s conclusion that 
the HRA establishes a dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature.
52
 
They say that the root of the problem with Young‘s approach is that it fails to 
identify what is, in fact, a fundamental feature of the HRA, namely, that it 
provides domestic remedies for rights drawn from international law. Sales and 
Ekins note that the ECtHR does not perceive itself to be participating in any 
form of democratic dialogue with each European legislature, ‗nor could it 
sensibly do so‘.53 The judgments of the ECtHR are legally binding on all three 
branches of the United Kingdom government so it is difficult, politically and 
legally, for the United Kingdom parliament to legislate inconsistently with 
judgments of the ECtHR.
54
 Sales and Ekins conclude that the ‗Strasbourg 
dimension‘ is a ‗fundamental aspect of the [HRA]‘.55 
After Anderson was handed down, Merris Amos wrote the following: 
 
―The judgment of the House of Lords was…a prime example of the 
courts, parliament and the executive engaging in a dialogue at the end 
                                                     
50
 For example, just prior to Anderson being handed down, the Liberal Democrat 
home affairs spokesman, Simon Hughes, was quoted as saying, ‗It would be wrong, 
even if understandable, for the home secretary to resist any judgment that went 
against him‘: see Vikram Dodd and Clare Dyer, ‗His Life in Whose Hands? Sarah 
Payne killer ordered to serve 50 years: Law lords to strip Home Secretary of right to 
set terms for murderers‘ The Guardian (London) 25 November 2002, 1.3. 
51
 Dodd and Dyer, ibid.  
52
 Philip Sales and Richard Ekins (n 15) 236. 
53
 Ibid 227-228. 
54
 Jason Varuhas ‗Courts in the service of Democracy: Why Courts Should Have a 
Constitutional (But Not Supreme) Role in Westminster Legal Systems‘ [2009] NZ 
Law Review 481, 515. Judgments of the ECtHR are of a declaratory nature: they state 
whether and to what extent there has been a violation of a human rights guarantee 
under the Convention. Pursuant to article 46 of the Convention, the United Kingdom 
is obliged to abide by any judgment in a case to which it is a party. It is an underlying 
norm of international law that a state will bring to an end any continuing or future 
violation of human rights of the kind mentioned in the judgment. There are examples 
of reluctance on the part of some states to follow the reasoning of the ECtHR but in 
the long run all the states have accepted its jurisprudence: see Georg Ress, ‗The Effect 
of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic 
Legal Order‘ (2005) 40 Tex ILJ 359. 
55
 Sales and Ekins (n 15) 229. 
DIALOGUE AND DECLARATIONS OF INCOMPATIBILITY UNDER 
SECTION 4 OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
 
 
56 
of which fundamental human rights emerged victorious as was 
intended by the architects of the [HRA].‖56 
 
If dialogue under the HRA is supposed to be an exchange of ideas about 
human rights between parliament and the courts pursuant to which policy 
goals are revised, but not blocked, following judicial decisions, there is real 
reason to doubt the accuracy of Amos‘ statement. It is clear that parliament 
was well aware of the case for the Home Secretary‘s role to be transferred to 
the judiciary; after all, as Amos accepts, numerous challenges to this role had 
been brought domestically and in the ECtHR.
57
 Mr Anderson‘s appeal could 
not have raised any new ―ideas‖ about human rights; hence, there could 
hardly have been an exchange of ideas about them.  
The government fought to retain the Home Secretary‘s power; Amos 
admits that Mr Blunkett ‗was anxious to retain his role‘.58 Once the House of 
Lords handed down its decision, the government relinquished that power. Was 
this an example of a policy goal being blocked or merely modified?  
The answer to this question depends upon what the policy goal actually 
was. If the goal was to ensure adequate punishment for murderers then an 
assessment of whether that goal has been achieved after Anderson is beyond 
the reach of this article. However, it seems fairly clear that Mr Blunkett 
formed the view that, in order to ensure that murderers received adequate 
punishment, it was necessary for the executive to have direct control of their 
minimum terms of imprisonment. If that was the government‘s goal then it 
was undoubtedly not achieved.  
Was that objective ‗blocked‘? The ‗Strasbourg dimension‘ was patently 
an important factor in the government‘s decision-making process. Although 
the government may have been anxious to retain its power, it knew that the 
ECtHR would demand its surrender. The government‘s hand was clearly 
forced by the prospect of an inevitably adverse ECtHR judgment.
59
  
Anderson did not produce an exchange of ideas about human rights. 
Depending on one‘s view of what the government‘s policy goal actually was, 
the process may very well have been closer to a monologue, judges doing the 
talking and legislatures the listening,
60
 than the dialogue alleged by Amos.  
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6. R (D) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME 
DEPARTMENT [2002] EWHC 2805 (ADMIN), [2003] 1 WLR 1315 
 
This case concerned a claimant who had been sentenced to a discretionary 
term of life imprisonment. He was subsequently transferred to a mental 
hospital and made the subject of restrictions. The claimant served the 
minimum period of his detention and applied for discharge. The mental health 
review tribunal did not have the power to order a patient‘s discharge. Under s 
74(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983, the mental health review tribunal was 
obliged to notify the Secretary of State whether, in its opinion, the patient was 
entitled to be discharged. Under s 74(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act 1983, if 
the tribunal formed the opinion that a patient was entitled to be conditionally 
discharged, the tribunal could recommend that, in the event of the patient not 
being discharged, the patient should continue to be detained in hospital. It was 
the Secretary of State's policy to refer to the Parole Board the cases of all 
restricted patients who remained in hospital following a tribunal 
recommendation under s 74(1)(b). The Parole Board had the power to direct 
the release of a patient; however there was no statutory right of access to a 
board hearing. Mr Justice Stanley Burnton made a declaration under s 4 of the 
HRA that the absence of any power in s 74 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to 
order the release of a prisoner: (a) who was sentenced to a discretionary life 
sentence; and (b) who was transferred to hospital and made subject to 
restrictions; and (c) who was subsequently the subject of a recommendation 
under s 74(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act 1983; and (d) who remained in 
hospital, was incompatible with his right to have the lawfulness of his 
detention decided speedily by a court pursuant to article 5(4) of the 
Convention. 
Section 295 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 amended s 74 of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 by inserting a new subsection (5A), which gave transferees 
such as the claimant in D a right of access to the Parole Board. As it was the 
policy of the Home Secretary, prior to D, to refer all such transferees to the 
Parole Board anyway, the amendment was ‗a change in form more than 
substance‘.61 The uncontroversial nature of the amendment was reflected in 
the fact that it was introduced and agreed to in the House of Lords without 
debate.
62
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7. BLOOD AND TARBUCK V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
HEALTH (HIGH COURT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 
SULLIVAN J, 28 FEBRUARY 2003, UNREPORTED) 
 
The facts of this case were reported in The Telegraph and Daily Mail 
newspapers on 28 February 2003.
63
 According to those newspaper reports, 
Mrs Blood and Mrs Tarbuck used the sperm of their respective deceased 
husbands to conceive children. Under s 28(6)(b) of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990, a man could not be named as the father of a child 
if his sperm was used to fertilise an egg after his death. The result was that the 
Blood and Tarbuck children‘s birth certificates did not state their fathers‘ 
names. The legal proceedings appear to have been brought by Mrs Blood and 
Mrs Tarbuck on their own account and on behalf of their children. The parties 
to the litigation agreed that the court should make a declaration pursuant to s 4 
of the HRA that s. 28(6)(b) was incompatible with human rights. Mr Justice 
Sullivan (as he then was) made a declaration in the terms sought. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 
introduced new subsections into s 28 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, which set out the circumstances in which certain 
deceased men could be registered as the father on a child‘s birth certificate. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 
was uncontentious, which is reflected in the fact that the declaration in Blood 
and Tarbuck was made with the consent of the Health Secretary. In 2001, the 
Labour government supported a private Members Bill that would have 
allowed a child conceived by in vitro fertilisation after the father‘s death to 
record his/her father‘s name on his/her birth certificate but it did not complete 
all its stages before the general election was called that year.
64
 When the issue 
was raised again in parliament in 2003, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act was passed with the support of all sides 
of politics.
65
   
 
8. BELLINGER V BELLINGER [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 AC 467 
 
The petitioner was a transsexual female who had been correctly classified 
and registered at birth as male but had undergone gender reassignment 
surgery. In 1981 she went through a ceremony of marriage with a man who 
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supported her petition for a declaration that the marriage was valid at its 
inception and subsisting. The judge at first instance refused to grant the 
declaration on the ground that ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ in s 11(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 were to be determined by reference to 
biological criteria and that the petitioner was a male and not a woman for the 
purposes of marriage.  
On 10 April 2003, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords 
dismissed her appeal but made a declaration pursuant to s 4 of the HRA that s 
11(c) was incompatible with the petitioner's right to respect for her private life 
under article 8(1) of the Convention and with her right to marry under article 
12 of the Convention. 
By the time that Bellinger was decided, steps were well underway to 
allow transsexual people to be officially recognised in the gender with which 
they identified. In 1999, the Home Secretary set up the Interdepartmental 
Working Group on Transsexual People. The Working Group published a 
report in April 2000, which put forward a number of options but suggested 
that the government put the matters out to public consultation. The Working 
Group was reconvened in 2002 to examine the implications of granting full 
legal status to transsexual people in their acquired gender.
66
 
On 11 July 2002, the ECtHR delivered judgments in favour of two 
transsexual people in Goodwin v United Kingdom
67
 and I v United Kingdom
68
, 
which effectively obliged the British government to recognise sex changes as 
legally valid. On 13 December 2002, the government announced that it would 
publish draft legislation that would give transsexual people legal recognition 
in their acquired gender.
69
  
On 27 November 2003, the Gender Recognition Bill had its first reading 
in the House of Lords.
70
 It eventually passed both houses of parliament: 155 
votes for to 57 against in the Lords and 335 votes for to 26 against in the 
Commons.
71
 The Gender Recognition Act 2004 enabled transsexual people to 
apply for legal recognition of their acquired gender. Successful applicants 
would be issued with a gender recognition certificate and would have the right 
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to marry in their acquired gender and be given birth certificates that 
recognised the acquired gender.   
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 was the outcome, not of the decision in 
Bellinger, but of the Working Group‘s consultation with the transsexual 
community in the United Kingdom and of the ECtHR‘s judgments in 
Goodwin and I.
72
 Indeed, in Bellinger, counsel for the intervening Lord 
Chancellor submitted that a declaration would serve no useful purpose as the 
government had already announced its intention to bring forward primary 
legislation on the subject.
73
 Bellinger did not result in any real exchange of 
ideas about human rights between parliament and the courts because the issue 
was already being fully considered by the government by the time the 
decision was handed down.  
 
9. R (M) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH [2003] EWHC 
1094 (ADMIN) 
 
The claimant was a 34 year old woman with a borderline personality 
disorder who was liable to detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. She 
had made allegations of sexual abuse against her adoptive father, which were 
denied by him. The claimant‘s adoptive father was her ‗nearest relative‘ as 
that term was defined in s 26 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The Mental 
Health Act 1983 gave various powers and entitlements to her adoptive father 
as her ‗nearest relative‘. Section 29 of the Mental Health Act 1983 enabled the 
replacement of a patient‘s ‗nearest relative‘ but only in limited circumstances 
and not on the application of the patient. As there were no legal means 
available to the claimant to compel her adoptive father‘s replacement, she 
applied for a declaration that ss 26 and 29 of the Mental Health Act 1983 were 
incompatible with her right to respect for her private life under article 8 of the 
Convention.  
In his reasons for judgment, Mr Justice Maurice Kay (as he then was) 
noted that the Health Secretary admitted that ss 26 and 29 were incompatible 
with article 8. His Honour stated that that was not surprising given that the 
ECtHR had come to that conclusion in JT v United Kingdom
74
. His Honour 
noted that the judgment of the ECtHR recorded a friendly settlement between 
JT and the British government pursuant to which the government undertook to 
amend the Mental Health Act 1983 in order to provide a detainee with the 
power to make an application to court to have the ‗nearest relative‘ replaced 
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where the patient reasonably objected to a certain person acting in that 
capacity. Following the friendly settlement in JT, no amending legislation had 
been enacted. The Health Secretary acknowledged the incompatibility but 
submitted that the government intended to enact amending legislation in the 
form of a comprehensive Mental Health Bill with a view to a root and branch 
reform of the 1983 Act. The government had, in fact, published a Draft Bill in 
the form of the Mental Health Bill 2002. It was for this reason that the Health 
Secretary submitted that a declaration was unnecessary. As the 
incompatibility had been identified some time previously but its removal had 
not taken place, Mr Justice Maurice Kay rejected the government‘s 
submission and made the declaration sought. 
Sections 23 – 26 of the Mental Health Act 2007 amended ss 26 – 29 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983. In particular, s 23 introduced a new right for a 
patient to apply for a court order displacing the ―nearest relative‖. 
M was similar to Bellinger in that the process of legislative change was 
well underway by the time the case was decided. If there was an exchange of 
ideas about human rights, it happened long before M was handed down. 
 
10. A V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME 
DEPARTMENT [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 (‘BELMARSH’) 
 
Following the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on 11 
September 2001, the British government concluded that there was a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation within the meaning of article 15 
of the Convention. Article 15 relevantly provides as follows: 
 
Derogation in time of emergency 
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any high contracting party may take measures derogating from 
its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 
 
Article 15 is not expressly incorporated by the HRA, but s 14 of the HRA 
makes provision for prospective derogations by the United Kingdom to be 
designated in an order made by the Secretary of State. Accordingly, the 
government made the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) 
Order 2001, designating the United Kingdom's proposed derogation, under 
article 15, from the right to personal liberty guaranteed by article 5(1) of the 
Convention. It then placed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill before 
parliament.  
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Part 4 of the Bill (ss 21 – 36) received a great deal of attention in 
parliament and was debated publicly at considerable length.
75
 As ultimately 
enacted, s 21 enabled the Home Secretary to certify that he reasonably 
believed that a person‘s presence in the United Kingdom was a risk to 
national security and that the person was a terrorist. Under s 23, foreign 
nationals so certified by the Home Secretary could be detained if they could 
not be deported because of fears for their safety or other practical 
considerations.  
It was pointed out to the Home Secretary, Mr Blunkett, that one of the 
UK‘s leading human rights barristers, David Pannick QC, had opined that the 
derogation from article 5 was unlawful because detention without trial was 
not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Mr Blunkett responded 
by saying that he was aware of Mr Pannick‘s comments but had received legal 
advice that they were incorrect.
76
 
Despite the misgivings of some about Part 4,
77
 parliament passed the Bill 
and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act came into force on 14 
December 2001. 
Due to the presence of a sunset clause,
78
 parliament was required to revive 
and renew ss 21 – 23 of the Act, which it duly did in 2003.79 Under the terms 
of the sunset clause, any renewal could only last a year so parliament was 
required to consider ss. 21 – 23 again in 2004. By that time, a review of the 
Act had been conducted by a committee of Privy Counsellors, chaired by 
Lord Newton of Braintree. The Newton Committee strongly recommended 
that the powers that allowed foreign nationals to be detained potentially 
indefinitely be replaced as a matter of urgency.
80
 Parliament noted the report
81
 
but decided to renew ss 21 – 23 again anyway.82 
In October 2004, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords heard an 
appeal by A and 8 other foreign nationals who had been detained under s 23 
of the Act. As most of the appellants were being held in Belmarsh prison in 
south-east London, A v Secretary of State for the Home Department became 
known as the Belmarsh decision.  
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On 16 December 2004, the Law Lords handed down their judgment in 
which they held that since s 23 applied to non-nationals suspected of 
international terrorism but not to nationals who presented the same threat; 
permitted non-national suspects to leave the United Kingdom; did not address 
the threat from nationals; and was capable of applying to individuals who did 
not pose that threat, it did not rationally address the threat to security and was 
not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation within the meaning of 
article 15. Their Lordships held that since the purpose of s 23 was to protect 
the United Kingdom from the risk of a terrorist attack, which could come 
from nationals or non-nationals, the fact that only non-national suspects were 
detained under s 23 meant that a declaration should be made that that section 
was incompatible with the right to liberty (article 5 of the Convention) and the 
prohibition against discrimination (article 14 of the Convention) in so far as it 
was disproportionate and permitted detention of suspected international 
terrorists in a way that discriminated on the ground of nationality or 
immigration status. 
The next day, the front page of The Guardian newspaper reported that the 
‗scathing‘ judgment had ‗left anti-terror laws in tatters‘.83 The Foreign 
Secretary, Jack Straw, was reported as saying that the Law Lords were 
‗simply wrong‘ to rule that terror suspects were being held arbitrarily without 
charge.
84
 The new Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, stated that he would not 
revoke the s 21 certificates or release the detainees but did say that he would 
study the judgment carefully to see whether it was possible to modify the Act 
to address the concerns raised by the Law Lords.
85
 
The following day, the front page of The Independent newspaper reported 
that the government‘s refusal to withdraw its anti-terror laws had left Britain 
on the brink of a constitutional crisis.
86
 
On 21 December 2004, The Guardian newspaper reported that Mr Clarke 
was being attacked for failing to announce what the government would do to 
respond to the judgment. The newspaper reported Conservative MP, Tony 
Baldry, as saying that the Law Lords ‗didn‘t make an ethical, moral or 
philosophical judgment…They made a legal judgment‘.87 
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On 26 January 2005, Mr Clarke told the House of Commons that, 
although the government believed that the Part 4 powers were justified, he 
accepted the declaration made by the Law Lords. He indicated that the 
government had decided to replace the Part 4 powers with a new system of 
control orders, which would limit the movement and communications of 
suspected terrorists.
88
 
On 3 February 2005, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, 
gave a lecture in which he told the audience that he not only accepted the 
Belmarsh judgment but that the government had got the balance wrong.
89
 
On 22 February 2005, Mr Clarke introduced the Prevention of Terrorism 
Bill into the House of Commons. As he had previously indicated, the Bill 
introduced a scheme of control orders applicable to all suspected terrorists 
irrespective of whether they were British or foreign nationals. In his statement 
to parliament, Mr Clarke made the following comments: 
 
―The Law Lords' judgment on 16 December found that the part 
4 powers in the 2001 Act were disproportionate and discriminatory in 
that they applied only to foreign nationals, and we had apparently 
managed to contain the threat from British nationals without 
detention…I accept that judgment, and therefore believe that it is 
important to address those concerns. We should not simply renew the 
current legislation, which the Law Lords so overwhelmingly regard as 
flawed. We should replace it—with strong measures that are fully 
compatible with the European convention on human rights, and 
applicable to both British and foreign nationals.‖90 
 
On 11 March 2005, parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
which repealed ss 21 – 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
and replaced detention with control orders. 
On 7 July 2005, 52 civilians were killed in a series of terrorist bombings 
in London. On 26 July 2005, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, gave a press 
conference in which he was reminded about Lord Hoffman‘s comments in the 
Belmarsh judgment (‗The real threat to the life of the nation…comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these‘)91 and asked whether there was ‗any 
way you can ensure the judges take account of what we think is now public 
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and parliamentary opinion?‘ The Prime Minister responded in the following 
terms: 
 
―I hope that recent events have created a situation where people can 
understand that it is important that we do protect ourselves and that in 
a sense if we can take measures to protect ourselves, it then becomes 
easier in a sense to protect our own way of life and our democracy and 
I doubt those words that you were quoting from one of those 
judgments would be uttered now.‖92 
 
The Prime Minister concluded his comments by stating that ‗one way of 
making sure we keep together is to make sure that the laws that I think the 
country would regard as the minimum necessary are actually passed and are 
then upheld‘.93 
The Prime Minister‘s answers were interpreted by some as indicating his 
disagreement with the Belmarsh decision.
94
 As Mr Blair‘s autobiography 
reveals, that interpretation was undoubtedly correct: 
 
―Less happy was the episode over the new anti-terror laws which we 
were seeking to pass following the House of Lords ruling in 
December 2004 that our existing power to detain suspects was 
unlawful under the Convention, which was now incorporated into UK 
law. Here, there was simply a fundamental disagreement between 
myself and the judiciary and media; or at least a large part of it, about 
the threat we faced. 
 
―Although these decisions are supposed to be a strict matter of law, 
inevitably in the human rights field there is a lot of subjective 
judgement around the politics. I doubt such a ruling would have been 
reached in September 2001 or July 2005 – ie in the wake of terrorist 
attacks in the US and London – but as time passes, the sense of 
urgency goes with it. And it was true: we were asking for draconian 
powers, unacceptable in principle except in the most rare 
circumstances.‖95 
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If the Prime Minister disagreed with Belmarsh, why didn‘t his 
government simply refuse to repeal ss 21 – 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001? Mr Blair offered the following explanation in his 
autobiography: 
 
―Once the House of Lords made the ruling, we had to amend the 
law.‖96 
 
Why was it that the Blair government had to amend the law? The diary of 
former Labour MP, Chris Mullin, reveals some of the government‘s thinking 
on the subject. Mr Mullin attended a meeting at the Prime Minister‘s office 
two days before the Belmarsh decision was handed down. His diary records 
the meeting in the following terms: 
 
―To Number 10 for a meeting about the detentions at Belmarsh…‖ 
 
―The Attorney General outlines the options. His starting point is that 
we should obey the forthcoming Lords‘ judgment, which is expected 
to go against the government. Alternatively, we could amend the law 
– ‗the difficulty is we don‘t know what to put in its place.‘‖ 
 
―‗It will be a big thing, if we don‘t accept the judgment,‘ the Attorney 
General said.‖97  
 
What Mr Mullin‘s diary note exposes is that, not only did the government 
know that it theoretically had the option of rejecting the Law Lords‘ 
judgment, it also knew that it would be a ‗big thing‘ if it took that option. 
How ‗big‘ of a ‗thing‘ would it have been? Lord Lloyd of Berwick painted a 
vivid picture in his 2005 Denning Lecture: 
 
―If the Government had rejected the decision in A‘s case, as it could 
have done, and renewed Part 4 of the 2001 Act when it expired, there 
would have been a major constitutional crisis. I shall never forget the 
sense of relief when…Mr Clarke as Home Secretary announced that 
the Government would accept the declaration of incompatibility…I 
would like to think that Mr Clarke‘s quiet acceptance of the decision 
in A‘s case marked the start of a new chapter in the relationship 
between the judges and the executive. Instead of crying foul, as the 
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Government might well have done when Mr Blunkett was Home 
Secretary, the executive has recognised that judges also have a job to 
do, especially in the realm of human rights. If this is so, then A‘s case 
was a decision of huge importance, not only in what it decided, but in 
the manner of the Government‘s acceptance of that decision.‖98 
 
In light of the media reports that followed the Belmarsh decision, Lord 
Lloyd was almost certainly right to surmise that any rejection of the judgment 
would have resulted in a major constitutional crisis. It should not be forgotten 
that 2005 was an election year. One can only imagine the hysteria that would 
have occurred if the government had been seen to ‗go against‘ the judgment 
of the highest court in the land. The Opposition would have likely had a field 
day with the issue. 
One of the Law Lords who delivered the Belmarsh judgment, Baroness 
Hale of Richmond, argued in her 2007 Ryan Lecture that, in the United 
Kingdom, all three organs of government were engaged in a constitutional 
dialogue.
99
 Lady Hale explained that part of the way that democratic dialogue 
was supposed to work was that, if legislation was incompatible with 
fundamental rights, the courts ‗decide how far they can go towards putting it 
right without trespassing on parliamentary sovereignty‘.100 She explained that 
parliamentary sovereignty was preserved by the issuing of a declaration 
because it did not ‗affect the validity of anything done under the statue and 
parliament still has a choice whether or not to do anything about it‘.101 Lady 
Hale cited the Belmarsh decision as evidence of the dialogue.
102
 
With the greatest of respect to Lady Hale, it seems difficult to classify the 
outcome of the Belmarsh decision as involving any kind of dialogue. 
Parliament was well aware of the rights arguments that would be deployed 
against the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in the courts. Despite 
this, it chose to enact and then renew ss 21 – 23 on a number of occasions, in 
the face of strong criticism. After the Belmarsh decision was handed down, 
the government clearly did not want to repeal ss 21 – 23 but, if it did not do 
so, it would have provoked a constitutional crisis. Just how little the 
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government thought of Law Lords‘ decision is demonstrated by the fact that it 
later took the unusual step of challenging its correctness in the ECtHR.
103
 
Despite the protestations of Lord Falconer, the better view is that the 
government amended the law, not because it thought that it was wrong, but 
because the political pressure to do anything else was just too great. The 
reality is that parliament had no choice: it had to amend the law just as Mr 
Blair said.  
The outcome was not arrived at by an exchange of views: it was dictated 
by the Law Lords. Prior to the Belmarsh decision being handed down, the 
Attorney General knew that the government could amend the law but didn‘t 
‗know what to put in its place‘. The comment suggests that the government 
needed to know what the courts thought the law should be before it could act. 
The Law Lords duly did tell the government what they thought the law should 
be. The leading judgment in Belmarsh was delivered by Lord Bingham who 
noted that when one of the appellants had been released on bail it was on 
stringent conditions that limited his freedom of movement and association.
104
 
Lord Bingham stated: 
 
―The appellants suggested that conditions of this kind, strictly 
enforced, would effectively inhibit terrorist activity. It is hard to see 
why this would not be so.‖105 
 
Taking the hint and now knowing what to put in place of detention orders, 
the government introduced the control order scheme under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005. 
Some might argue that Belmarsh did not involve the rejection of a key 
legislative policy goal: the legislative objective was to keep the public safe 
from foreigners suspected of terrorism and the enactment of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 ensured that that objective was achieved in a way that 
was properly respectful of human rights. In response, two things can be said. 
Firstly, it is unlikely that Belmarsh did not result in the blocking of a key 
policy goal. As Mr Blair says in his autobiography, he conceived of offering 
foreigners suspected of terrorism a choice: ‗leave the country, or stay in 
custody‘.106 The Belmarsh decision totally obstructed this objective. Secondly, 
even if a key objective was not frustrated, the legislature‘s policy was 
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distorted, and arguably not in a constructive way.
107
 As Baroness Hale herself 
noted, seven people who were subject to control orders had, by the time of her 
lecture, gone missing so ‗its effectiveness as a preventive measure is 
questionable‘.108 
Lord Lloyd was prescient to say that Belmarsh was a decision of huge 
importance, not only in what it decided, but in the manner of the 
government‘s acceptance of that decision. If a government that believed so 
strongly in legislation on such an important subject matter was not willing to 
defend it in the face of a declaration, perhaps no government ever would? The 
outcome of Belmarsh was strong evidence of the proposition that, in the 
future, it would be, as Lord Lloyd predicted, ‗for the judges, and ultimately 
for Strasbourg, to say what the Convention means‘.109 
 
11. R (WILKINSON) V INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS 
[2005] UKHL 30, [2006] 1 ALL ER 529 
 
The taxpayer was a widower whose wife died on 23 June 1999. At that 
time, s 262 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 provided for a 
bereavement allowance payable only to widows. By s 34 of the Finance Act 
1999, s 262 ceased to have effect in relation to deaths occurring after 6 April 
2000. By letter of 11 December 2000, the Inland Revenue Commissioners 
refused the taxpayer's claim to a payment on the ground that there was no 
basis in United Kingdom law for allowing widowers to claim the widow's 
bereavement allowance. The judge refused the taxpayer's claim for judicial 
review of the commissioners' decision, but granted a declaration that s 262 
was incompatible with article 14 of the Convention (‗The enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex…‘) when read with article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention (‗Every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions‘). The taxpayer took his appeal to 
the House of Lords, arguing that it was possible to read s 262 as including 
widowers. The House of Lords dismissed his appeal. 
Wilkinson did not result in dialogue. The incompatibility was removed by 
s 34 of the Finance Act 1999, which was enacted well before the taxpayer 
filed his claim for judicial review. 
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12. R (MORRIS) V WESTMINSTER CITY COUNCIL (NO 3) [2005] 
EWCA CIV 1184, [2006] 1 WLR 505: R (GABAJ) V FIRST 
SECRETARY OF STATE (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, 28 
MARCH 2006, UNREPORTED) 
 
The facts of Morris were that the claimant and her daughter came to the 
United Kingdom from Mauritius and were given leave to enter as visitors. 
When their leave to remain expired, the claimant applied for a British passport 
on the basis that she was a British citizen by descent. That status was 
subsequently recognised and she obtained a British passport, while her 
daughter was not thought eligible for British citizenship and remained a 
citizen of Mauritius alone. The claimant subsequently applied to the defendant 
council for accommodation under the Housing Act 1996. That application was 
refused on the basis that the claimant did not have a ‗priority need for 
accommodation‘. The council, relying on s 185(4) of the Housing Act 1996, 
subsequently confirmed its decision.  
Under s 189 of the Housing Act 1996, a person with dependent children 
had a ‗priority need for accommodation‘. However, s 185(4) prevented an 
otherwise eligible applicant from relying on a person subject to immigration 
control to bring him/her within the class of persons with dependent children. 
In other words, if the claimant‘s daughter had been British, the claimant 
would have had a ‗priority need for accommodation‘. As the claimant‘s 
daughter was not British, the claimant did not have a ‗priority need for 
accommodation‘.  
On 14 October 2005, the Court of Appeal declared that s 185(4) was 
incompatible with the right under article 14 of the Convention to enjoy 
without discrimination the right under article 8 of the Convention to respect 
for home and family life to the extent that it required a dependent child of a 
British citizen, if both were habitually resident in the United Kingdom, to be 
disregarded when determining whether the British citizen had a priority need 
for accommodation, when that child was subject to immigration control. 
The government‘s response to Morris took some time to develop. On 3 
March 2006, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister informed parliament‘s 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (‗JCHR‘) that the government had decided 
not to appeal the decision.
110
 On 28 March 2006, the Administrative Court 
made a declaration by consent in Gabaj
111
 that s 185(4) was incompatible 
with the Convention, albeit in slightly different terms to the declaration in 
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Morris. On 27 June 2006, the Minister for Housing and Planning, Yvette 
Cooper, advised the JCHR that the government intended to remedy the 
incompatibility as quickly as possible.
112
 
Schedule 15 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 introduced 
amendments to the Housing Act 1996 that meant that s 185(4) would no 
longer apply to British citizens.
113
 Accordingly, a British citizen with a 
dependent child who applied for housing, like Mrs Morris, would have a 
‗priority need for accommodation‘ even if that child was not a British citizen 
and subject to immigration control. The housing authority to which the 
application was made would discharge its duty to the applicant, not by 
offering long-term social housing, but by arranging an offer of 
accommodation in the private rental sector. The policy concerns of the 
government and the purpose of Schedule 15 were explained by the Under-
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Iain Wright, when 
the Commons was considering the amendments: 
 
―This is a complex area of law, but in summary, the issue at stake is 
what help British citizens whose household includes members with 
different immigration status should get if they become homeless. The 
amendments will ensure that in future, households in those 
circumstances will be provided with suitable housing, while 
continuing to ensure that people from abroad with no claim to UK 
public resources cannot confer entitlement to long-term social 
housing.‖114 
 
The amendments were passed by parliament without dissent.
115
  
Although Morris posed ‗particularly difficult‘ policy problems,116 there 
are reasons to believe that the parliament was comfortable with the ultimate 
outcome as expressed in the amendments to the Housing Act 1996. Firstly, the 
government naturally accepted that British citizens had to be provided with 
some form of housing assistance if they became homeless through no fault of 
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their own.
117
 Secondly, as noted above, the amendments were agreed to 
without dissent. Thirdly, it seems unlikely that the amendments would have 
resulted in significant additional expenditure for the government. Only a small 
number of people were affected by the operation of s 185(4).
118
 The 
amendments did not result in migrants obtaining access to scarce and valuable 
social housing. Accordingly, there is good cause to think that Morris did 
provoke an exchange of ideas about rights pursuant to which policy goals 
were revised but not blocked. 
 
13. R (CLIFT) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME 
DEPARTMENT [2006] UKHL 54, [2007] 1 AC 484  
 
The claimants were foreign citizens who had been sentenced to lengthy 
terms of imprisonment and made subject to deportation orders. By virtue of ss 
46(1) and 50(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the Parole Board had no 
power to recommend the early release on licence of long-term prisoners 
subject to deportation orders and the decision was at the discretion of the 
Home Secretary. The claimants each made representations for early release 
but the Home Secretary decided not to order their release. The claimants 
sought judicial review of the Home Secretary's decisions as being contrary to 
articles 5 and 14 of the Convention
119
 in that they were treated differently 
from long-term prisoners who were not subject to deportation because those 
prisoners were entitled to the benefit of a referral to the Parole Board. The 
judge at first instance allowed the claims but was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal. 
On appeal, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords held that 
differential treatment afforded to prisoners liable to deportation by having 
their release dates determined by the Secretary of State could not be 
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objectively justified, given the Parole Board's ability to make such 
determinations. Accordingly, a declaration would be made that ss 46(1) and 
50(2) were incompatible with article 14, read with article 5, to the extent that 
they prevented prisoners liable for removal having their cases reviewed by the 
Parole Board in the same manner as other long-term prisoners. 
By the time the matter was heard by the House of Lords, ss 46(1) and 
50(2) had been repealed and replaced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. But 
they continued to apply to offences committed before 4 April 2005 pursuant 
to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No 8 and Transitional and 
Saving Provisions) Order 2005 so they continued to apply to the claimants. 
Section 27 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 amended the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 to remove the incompatibility in transitional cases. 
Section 27 seems to have been enacted without difficulty or controversy. 
Although the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 had a long passage 
through parliament, the wording of s 27 did not change from the time that it 
was first presented.
120
 The Public Bill Committee appointed to consider the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill agreed, without dissent, that it should 
form part of the legislation.
121
 The JCHR concurred, saying that it was a 
‗simple‘ remedy to a ‗straightforward legal problem‘.122 
 
14. SMITH V SCOTT [2007] CSIH 9, 2007 SC 345 
 
This case concerned the incapacity of convicted prisoners to vote pursuant 
to s 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, which relevantly provides 
as follows: 
 
―A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal 
institution in pursuance of his sentence…is legally incapable of voting 
at any parliamentary or local government election.‖ 
 
On 6 October 2005, the ECtHR held in Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2)
123
 
that s 3 violated article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention. Article 3 
provides as follows: 
 
―The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
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ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of 
the legislature.‖ 
 
For present purposes it is important to note that the ECtHR has interpreted 
article 3 as conferring individual suffrage rights and has held that the 
undertaking given by the High Contracting Parties (which obviously includes 
the United Kingdom) obliges them to take positive steps to guarantee those 
rights.
124
 
On 2 February 2006, the British government indicated that, as a result of 
the Hirst decision, it would undertake a public consultation in relation to 
prisoners' voting rights.
125
 
On 14 February 2006, the Registration Appeal Court (in effect, the 
Scottish Court of Session) first began to hear Mr Smith‘s appeal. Mr Smith 
was a convicted drug dealer whose application to be included in the register of 
electors had been refused pursuant to s 3 of the Representation of the People 
Act 1983. The time allocated for the appeal was insufficient and it was 
adjourned to a later date. 
On 14 December 2006, the Department of Constitutional Affairs 
published a consultation document, which set out the principles of prisoner 
enfranchisement and the options available to the United Kingdom.
126
 
On 11 January 2007, the Registration Appeal Court reconvened for the 
final time on Mr Smith‘s appeal. During the course of the appeal, counsel for 
the Secretary of State for Scotland informed the court that the Secretary of 
State fully accepted the Hirst decision.
127
 The Secretary of State submitted 
that a declaration was unnecessary as the government was already aware that s 
3 was not Convention-compliant and action was being taken to remedy that 
situation.
128
 
On 24 January 2007, the court delivered its judgment in which it noted 
that, although the government had published its consultation document, the 
issue of prisoners‘ voting rights had not been resolved despite having been in 
                                                     
124
 Sophie Briant, ‗Dialogue, Diplomacy and Defiance: Prisoners‘ Voting Rights at 
Home and in Strasbourg‘ [2011] EHRLR 243, 244 citing Mathieu-Mohin and 
Clerfayt v Belgium (Series A no. 113), judgment of 2 March 1987, 22-23.  
125
 Smith v Scott 2007 SC 345, 360-361. 
126
 Steve Foster, ‗The Long and Winding Road: the Battle for the Prisoner‘s Right to 
Vote‘ (2011) 16(1) Cov LJ 19, 21 citing Department of Constitutional Affairs (UK), 
‗Voting Rights of Convicted Prisoners Detained Within the United Kingdom – The 
UK Government‘s Response to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights‘ Judgment in Hirst v United Kingdom‘ CP29/06 (2006). 
127
 Smith v Scott 2007 SC 345, 349. 
128
 Ibid 364. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 
75 
the public arena for a long time.
129
 In those circumstances and in light of the 
fact that the Scottish parliamentary election would be held in May 2007, the 
court decided that it would make a declaration that s 3 was incompatible with 
article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention.
130
 
The declaration of the Scottish court produced no response in the British 
parliament.  
On 27 March 2007, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, informed the 
JCHR that the government did not believe that the declaration required urgent 
action because the judgment did not establish any new principle beyond that 
established in Hirst. The Lord Chancellor also noted that the government‘s 
consultation process was still underway.
131
 
Thereafter, it is fair to say that the Labour government relied upon the 
consultation process to delay law reform on the topic for the remainder of its 
time in office.
132
 The new Conservative/Liberal Democrat government, 
elected in May 2010, had no real desire to amend the law either. The 
politically popular view was enunciated by Prime Minister David Cameron in 
November 2010: ‗Frankly, when people commit a crime and go to prison, 
they should lose their rights, including the right to vote‘.133 
Eventually, the issue came before the ECtHR again in Scoppola v Italy 
(No 3)
134
, a case concerning prisoner voting rights in which the United 
Kingdom was given leave to intervene. The United Kingdom submitted that 
the findings in Hirst were wrong and that the ECtHR should revisit its 
decision.
135
 On 22 May 2012, the ECtHR rejected that submission and 
reaffirmed the principles set down in Hirst.
136
 
The result of Scoppola was that the United Kingdom government was 
required to provide the ECtHR with proposals that satisfied article 3 of the 
First Protocol within 6 months of the judgment.
137
 
On 22 November 2012, the British government published the Voting 
Eligibility (Prisoners) Draft Bill and announced it would be considered by a 
joint committee of both houses of parliament. The draft bill set out 3 different 
potential approaches for the committee to consider. The first would enable 
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prisoners sentenced to less than 4 years to vote. The second would limit the 
vote to prisoners sentenced to 6 months or less. The third approach would 
continue the ban on prisoner voting.
138
  
As at today‘s date, the joint committee has not been appointed, the issue 
has not been resolved and there is still much drama to be played out. Prime 
Minister Cameron has stated very clearly that prisoners will not get the vote 
under his government.
139
 The Labour Party has proclaimed its opposition to 
prisoner enfranchisement too.
140
 The current Home Secretary, Theresa May, 
has indicated that the next Conservative government will scrap the HRA and 
may leave the Convention altogether.
141
 Against this backdrop, it has been 
reported
142
 that the UK Supreme Court will hear an appeal in June 2013 by a 
convicted murderer, George McGeoch, who has not been allowed to add his 
name to the electoral register.
143
    
Whatever the eventual outcome, it seems fairly clear that the declaration 
in Smith did not result in an exchange of views between parliament and the 
judiciary about the voting rights of prisoners. Due to the decision in Hirst, 
consideration of that issue was well underway by the time the judgment in 
Smith was handed down. Furthermore, there was no parliamentary response to 
the declaration. It was not a case of parliament considering and then rejecting 
the Registration Appeal Court‘s opinion: it was more or less ignored. 
Parliament‘s failure to respond to the declaration in Smith raises some 
interesting implications for dialogue theory. It is evidence that a declaration 
might not have the practical effect of compelling parliament to comply with 
the views of the judiciary. How could parliament ignore the declaration in 
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Smith yet be forced to comply with the ruling in Belmarsh? The answer 
probably lies in the different circumstances surrounding the two cases:  
 
a) Previous ECtHR decision. By the time Smith was handed down, 
parliament was already dealing with the binding decision of the 
ECtHR in Hirst. Smith was merely a non-binding (in the strict legal 
sense) affirmation of Hirst. By contrast, Belmarsh was the sole 
judicial authority as to whether the government‘s detention scheme 
was compatible with human rights. 
 
b) Public support for the legislation in question. The enfranchisement of 
prisoners had almost no popular support. By contrast, the detention 
system introduced by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
was controversial and many people supported its abolition. 
 
c) Public awareness of the declaration. The Belmarsh decision was 
highly-publicised in the media. By contrast, Smith was a relatively 
obscure decision of a Scottish court. 
 
d) Public respect for the declaration. Belmarsh was a ruling of the 
highest court in the United Kingdom. By contrast, the Registration 
Appeal Court in Smith effectively followed a previous ruling of an 
unpopular European court. 
 
Taken together, these factors probably made it relatively easier, from a 
political standpoint, for the government to effectively disregard Smith as 
compared to Belmarsh.  
As noted above, at present it is unclear as to whether parliament will 
eventually give some prisoners the right to vote. A decision by the Supreme 
Court in Mr McGeoch‘s favour may force parliament‘s hand, much as the 
declaration in Belmarsh did.
144
 The issue of prisoner enfranchisement may 
end up playing a decisive role, not only in determining whether parliament 
can have the final say under the HRA, but in the very future of that Act.    
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15. R (BAIAI) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME 
DEPARTMENT (NOS 1 AND 2) [2008] UKHL 53, [2009] 1 AC 287 
 
In the United Kingdom, non-European Economic Area nationals are 
subject to immigration control and require leave to enter or remain in the 
country. Section 19 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc) Act 2004, together with the Immigration (Procedure for Marriage) 
Regulations 2005, introduced a regime under which non-EEA nationals had to 
apply to the Home Secretary for a certificate of approval to marry if they 
wished to enter into a marriage otherwise than in accordance with the rites of 
the Church of England. The Home Secretary‘s policy was that, in order to 
obtain a certificate, an applicant had to have valid leave to enter or remain in 
the United Kingdom for more than six months (and more than three months of 
that leave had to be unexpired at the time of the application), or exceptionally 
compelling compassionate grounds.  
The claimants were refused certificates. They sought judicial review and a 
declaration of incompatibility on the grounds that the s 19 regime and the 
Home Secretary‘s policy were incompatible with the right to marry protected 
by article 12 of the Convention. The Home Secretary maintained that the 
regime was necessary in order to avoid the abuse of immigration rights by 
marriages of convenience. 
The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords found that the conditions 
set out in the Home Secretary‘s policy, though relevant to immigration status, 
had no relevance to the genuineness of a proposed marriage, which was the 
only relevant criterion for determining whether permission should be given. 
Their Lordships held that, since the effect of the policy, subject to the 
discretionary compassionate exception, was to impose a blanket prohibition 
on exercise of the right to marry by all those within the specified categories 
irrespective of whether the parties' proposed marriages were ones of 
convenience, the scheme represented a disproportionate interference with the 
right to marry. The scheme violated article 12 to that extent and a declaration 
was made accordingly. 
The certificate of approval scheme was abolished by the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (Remedial) Order 2011. 
The Order was approved by the House of Commons without debate.
145
 In the 
House of Lords, the Minister of State for Security and Counter Terrorism, 
Baroness Neville-Jones, moved that the Order be approved, stating: 
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―The Government want to bring this order into force subject to your 
Lordships' agreement. We are doing so for two reasons. First, the 
domestic courts have declared that the scheme is incompatible with 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Abolishing the scheme 
will remove this incompatibility. Secondly, changes made following 
rulings from the domestic courts have weakened the scheme and the 
Government do not consider it any longer to be an effective method of 
dealing with sham marriages.‖146 
 
Lord Avebury indicated that the Liberal Democrat Party welcomed the 
Order.
147
 Lord Rosser signalled that the Labour Party also supported the Order 
‗in light of the court judgments‘ but stated that he had a number of concerns 
about whether the government could continue to restrict sham marriages.
148
 In 
response to Lord Rosser, Baroness Neville-Jones declared that: 
 
―Although there is some anxiety in the House, which I share, about 
our ability to control the situation, we will be monitoring it carefully 
and making our best efforts to ensure that [the sham marriage] route is 
not used. I hope that the House will feel it necessary to abolish the 
scheme and, on the basis of the Government putting in place the best 
methods that we can to control this, approve the order.‖149 
 
The House of Lords duly approved the Order. 
As all sides of British politics appeared to accept that the abolition of the 
certificate of approval scheme was necessary, Baiai may very well have 
produced a real exchange of views about human rights between the judiciary 
and parliament. 
 
16. R (WRIGHT) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH [2009] 
UKHL 3, [2009] 1 AC 739 
 
The claimants were care workers who were referred to the Health 
Secretary under s 82(1) of the Care Standards Act 2000, which made 
provision for keeping a list of people considered unsuitable to work with 
vulnerable adults. Pending the determination of each reference, the Health 
Secretary provisionally included the claimants' names in the list pursuant to s 
82(4)(b), which made no provision for first according them a hearing.   
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The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords held that, given the 
possibility that provisional listing under s 82(4)(b) could result in irreparable 
damage to a person's employment or prospects of employment in the care 
sector, the denial of an opportunity to answer allegations before being listed 
meant that s 82(4)(b) contravened the right to a fair hearing under article 6(1) 
of the Convention. The House of Lords further held that the listing of a person 
on suspicion of such serious misconduct as to indicate that he or she posed a 
risk to vulnerable adults could result in stigma so great as to constitute an 
interference with the right to respect for private life under article 8 of the 
Convention. Accordingly, their Lordships made a declaration that s 82(4) was 
incompatible with articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. 
The day before the judgment was handed down, the government 
announced that the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA) had assumed 
full responsibility for deciding whether a person should be barred from 
working with children and vulnerable adults.
150
 This new barring system was 
a completely different system to that considered in Wright. Indeed, the 
existence of the new scheme was referred to in the judgment but the Law 
Lords noted that they had ‗not heard argument upon whether or not that 
scheme is compatible with the Convention rights as the question does not 
arise on these appeals‘.151  
The new vetting and barring system was established in response to 
findings of the Bichard Inquiry, which had been set up in 2004 following the 
conviction of Ian Huntley, a school caretaker, for the murders of two 
schoolgirls.
152
 The Inquiry report recommended, amongst other things, that a 
registration scheme should be established for those wishing to work with 
children or vulnerable adults. The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 
provided for such a scheme, maintained by the ISA.
153
 
In short, the abolition of the old scheme and the introduction of the new 
vetting and barring scheme were not instigated by the declaration in Wright.  
 
17. R (F AND THOMPSON) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE 
HOME DEPARTMENT [2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 AC 331 
 
The claimants were sex offenders. By virtue of the nature of their offences 
and the length of their sentences, they became automatically subject for an 
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indefinite period to the notification requirements in ss 82 – 86 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003. By these requirements, an offender has to inform the 
police of certain personal details and by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Travel 
Notification Requirements) Regulations 2004, made pursuant to s 86, an 
offender has to inform the police of the details of foreign travel plans. These 
notification requirements are what are known colloquially as the ‗sex 
offenders register‘.154  
The Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division made a declaration 
that the absence of any mechanism for review of the notification requirements 
in the 2003 Act was a disproportionate interference with the right to respect 
for private and family life guaranteed by article 8 of the Convention.
155
 On 
appeal, the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal
156
 and the Supreme 
Court. 
The Supreme Court‘s judgment was handed down on 21 April 2010. The 
government‘s response took some time to develop but, when it came, it was 
ferocious. 
On 16 February 2011, the Home Secretary, Ms May, made a statement in 
the House of Commons in which she declared that the government was 
‗disappointed and appalled‘ by the decision in F and Thompson. She 
proclaimed that the government would make the ‗minimum possible changes 
to the law in order to comply with the ruling‘.157 
Prime Minister Cameron also declared that he was ‗appalled‘ by the 
decision, stating how ‗completely offensive‘ it was to ‗once again…have a 
ruling by a court that flies in the face of common sense‘.158 
Interestingly, the Home Secretary asserted that: 
 
―I would far rather not have to stand here saying that we have to make 
a change to the sex offenders register, but we do have to make a 
change.‖159 
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After this assertion was made, Labour MP Jack Straw put the following 
proposition to Ms May: 
 
―[Will] she confirm that under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 
1998 there is absolutely no obligation on her or the House to change 
the law one bit? All the Court did was to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility and section 4 makes it absolutely clear that any 
decision following that is a matter for the sovereign Parliament. It 
would be entirely lawful for the House and her to say that the existing 
regime will continue without any amendment.‖160 
 
The Home Secretary responded to that proposition in the following terms: 
 
―The right hon. Gentleman makes a point about the application of the 
Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights and 
about Parliament having the final decision about what should happen. 
In this case, Parliament will have the final decision on what 
happens.‖161 
 
It is probably fair to say that the Home Secretary fudged the issue. If she 
had been willing to answer the question directly, her answer may have been 
along the following lines, ‗It is politically easier for the government to blame 
the judiciary and make minor changes to the legislation than it is to leave the 
legislation as it stands and provoke a constitutional crisis‘.162  
Of course, there may very well have been other reasons why the 
government thought it necessary to amend the legislation. When the amending 
instrument was eventually placed before parliament (the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 (Remedial) Order 2012), the Conservative peer, Baroness Stowell of 
Beeston, stated that: 
 
―Our constitutional arrangements are such that when the highest court 
of the land identifies an incompatibility with the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the Government of the day, whoever is in power, 
take remedial action. This is for various reasons, not the least of which 
is to ensure that the Government are not left vulnerable to further legal 
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proceedings, potentially involving millions of pounds of taxpayers‘ 
money.‖163 
 
In other words, the threat of proceedings in the ECtHR (which the 
government clearly could not win) was a powerful incentive to amend the 
legislation. 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012 enabled sex 
offenders to apply to the police for a review of whether their notification 
requirements should cease. The application could only be made once a fixed 
period of time had expired following the offender‘s release from custody: for 
adults this period was 15 years and for children it was 8 years. Offenders 
could appeal from the police decision to the magistrates‘ court but the onus 
would be on them to demonstrate that they no longer posed a risk to the 
community. 
It is unclear whether this new policy was a distortion of the old (that is, 
less effective but more easily defensible before the courts).
164
 The Labour 
Party certainly had serious reservations about the costs involved in allowing 
offenders to apply for a review and the risk to the community in permitting 
offenders to come off the register. They refused to support the new policy.
165
 
Unfortunately, sex offences committed by persons released from the register 
will be a prerequisite to determining whether the Labour Party‘s stance was 
correct.  
It is possible that the government‘s rage over F and Thompson was merely 
confected. The outbursts from the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary 
occurred well after the decision was handed down. The government did, of 
course, theoretically have the power to ignore F and Thompson and the Home 
Secretary did concede that parliament would make the final decision on the 
appropriate policy. If the government had chosen not to amend the legislation, 
the Labour Party may very well have supported that position. 
It seems more likely, however, in light of Ms May‘s subsequent 
declaration that the next Conservative government would scrap the HRA,
166
 
that the frustration expressed by Conservative politicians about F and 
Thompson was genuine. The Conservatives were probably confronted with a 
conundrum similar to that faced by the Labour government after the Anderson 
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decision. They did not want to afford criminals additional rights but, by the 
same token, they did not want to come into direct conflict with the highest 
court in the nation. Ignoring the declaration would simply mean that the 
matter would be taken to the ECtHR where the government would inevitably 
lose.  
There may have been another factor that influenced the policy outcome: 
the fact that the government was a coalition between the Conservative Party 
and the Liberal Democrat Party. The Liberal Democrats were probably much 
more inclined to accept that the government should follow the Supreme 
Court‘s ruling than many Conservatives were.167 Amendment of the 
legislation may have been a price that Conservatives such as the Prime 
Minister and the Home Secretary were willing to pay in order to keep the 
coalition intact.   
The making of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012 was 
about raw politics; it had little to do with principle. Neither the Conservative 
Party nor the Labour Party really thought that allowing sex offenders an 
opportunity to come off the register was a good idea. It would be far-fetched 
to describe the process as having involved a genuine exchange of opinions 
about rights. Like Anderson, if there was any flow of information, it was 
closer to a monologue, judges doing the talking and legislatures the listening, 
than a dialogue. 
 
18. R (ROYAL COLLEGE OF NURSING) V SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT [2010] EWHC 2761 
(ADMIN); [2011] PTSR 1193 
 
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 provided for a registration 
scheme for those wishing to work with children or vulnerable adults, which 
was maintained by the ISA.  
Under the scheme, persons convicted of or cautioned for a serious sexual 
offence would be placed on the barred lists with no opportunity to make 
representations as to why their inclusion might be unwarranted.
168
 Pursuant to 
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paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 to the Act (when read with the regulations
169
), 
persons convicted of or cautioned for specified offences that were less grave 
than the aforementioned serious sexual offences would also be automatically 
placed on the barred lists but had the right to make representations as to why 
they should be removed. It is the latter category with which the Royal College 
of Nursing case was concerned. 
The facts of Royal College of Nursing were that the ISA placed the second 
to fourth claimant nurses on the barred lists after having been informed that 
they had been cautioned for relatively minor offences. Their names were 
subsequently removed but the nurses suffered a significant loss of wages 
during the periods when they had been unable to work. The first claimant, a 
body representing the interests of the nursing profession, and the nurses 
challenged the lawfulness of the scheme. 
On 10 November 2010, Mr Justice Wyn Williams held, after considering 
the decision in Wright, that the nurses‘ inability to make representations in 
advance of listing was a breach of article 6 of the Convention. His Honour 
also found that the scheme gave rise to potential breaches of article 8. 
Accordingly, his Honour declared that paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 to the Act 
was incompatible with articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. 
By the time that the case was argued before Mr Justice Wyn Williams, the 
new Conservative/Liberal Democrat government had already announced that 
the vetting and barring scheme would be reviewed and remodelled.
170
 In the 
review report dated February 2011, the government stated: 
 
―Following a recent judicial review brought by the Royal College of 
Nurses, the ―autobar with representations‖ element of the scheme has 
been found by the courts not to be compatible with human rights 
obligations, to the extent that a person is barred before having any 
opportunity to make representations against the decision. This 
decision has been accepted by Ministers and it follows that this 
process must be changed in any new scheme.‖171 
 
The process was changed by s 67 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. 
Under the new process, the ISA was required to seek representations from an 
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individual who had committed one of those specified offences less grave than 
a serious sexual offence prior to reaching a decision on whether to place that 
person on the barred lists. If no representations were received within the 
prescribed time period, the ISA was required to place the individual on the 
lists. 
The need to amend the Act was, as the review report indicated, accepted 
by the government. The new process was uncontroversial and proceeded 
unchallenged through parliament.
172
 Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
Royal College of Nursing probably did result in an exchange of views about 
rights between the judiciary and parliament pursuant to which policy may 
very well have been constructively amended. 
 
19. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Of the 18 cases in which declarations of incompatibility have been 
finalised, 17 have resulted in change to legislation for one reason or another. 
The only case in which the making of a declaration of incompatibility 
pursuant to s 4 of the HRA has not resulted in legislative change is Smith v 
Scott. The issue of whether prisoners will get the vote should be decided, at 
the latest, by the outcome of the 2015 general election. That election is also 
likely to be critical in determining the future of the HRA.  
Of the 17 cases resulting in legislative change, it could only rightly be 
argued that 8 of them involved a process of ‗dialogue‘ between the courts, 
parliament and the executive (that is, there was an exchange of ideas about 
human rights pursuant to which policy goals were revised, but not blocked, 
following the judicial decision): 
 
 R (H) v London North and East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal 
 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 
 R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
 R (Morris) v Westminster City Council (No 3) 
 R (Gabaj) v First Secretary of State 
 R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
 R (Baiai) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Nos 1 and 2) 
 R (Royal College of Nursing) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
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Of those 8 cases, 2 dealt with the exactly the same statutory provision: 
Morris and Gabaj. It should also be noted that the declaration in D had no real 
effect because the new legislation simply accorded with what the 
government‘s practice had always been. 
It could not be rightly argued that the other 9 cases involved a process of 
‗dialogue‘. 
In 6 of those 9 cases, the process of amending the impugned legislation 
was well underway, or indeed completed, by the time the court made the 
declaration of incompatibility: 
 
 Re an Application for Judicial Review by McR 
 Blood and Tarbuck v Secretary of State for Health 
 Bellinger v Bellinger 
 R (M) v Secretary of State for Health 
 R (Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
 R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health 
 
In these 6 cases, the making of a declaration did not cause the legislative 
change. There could not have been ‗dialogue‘ because the policy goals were 
revised before the judicial decision, not after. 
The remaining 3 cases were the ones that attracted the most public 
interest:  
 
 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (‗Belmarsh‘) 
 R (F and Thompson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
 
In each of these 3 cases, the making of the declaration was a direct cause 
of the legislative change that followed. However, in at least 2 cases, Anderson 
and Belmarsh, the government was well aware of the human rights arguments 
against the relevant legislation long before the judicial decision was handed 
down. In all 3 cases (especially in relation to Belmarsh), there is strong 
evidence to support the proposition that the government did not want to 
amend the relevant legislation but was compelled to by the judicial decision. 
Furthermore, in at least 2 cases, Belmarsh and F and Thompson, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the new public policy, forced into place by the 
judicial decision, may be less effective than the old. It seems strained, to say 
the least, to describe as ‗dialogue‘ a process whereby one party knows the 
arguments against its position, does not accept them, receives a ‗signal‘173 
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from another party that those arguments should be accepted, then complies 
with those arguments even though they disagree with them for perfectly valid 
reasons.
174
 
Whether or not the process is described as ‗dialogue‘, ‗institutional 
interaction‘ or something else is probably irrelevant; what is important is to 
recognise that parliament does not, in reality, have much, if any, freedom to 
disagree with the conclusions of the courts on questions of rights when a 
declaration has been made. This has obvious implications for the traditional 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom. As predicted by 
Mark Tushnet, the HRA may very well have escalated into what is effectively 
strong-form judicial review.
175
    
As cases such as R (H) v London North and East Region Mental Health 
Review Tribunal indicate, it is possible that the making of a declaration might 
lead to a constructive modification of public policy (from a rights 
perspective). However, as Belmarsh and F and Thompson suggest, it is also 
possible that declarations might lead to less effective policy. Further research 
in this respect is clearly required, especially in circumstances where 
parliament appears to have at least some capability of dealing with rights 
issues in the absence of ‗signals‘ in the form of s 4 declarations. If the policy 
benefits of ‗dialogue‘ are negligible then the wisdom of revising the long-
established model of responsible government in the United Kingdom might be 
called into question.  
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